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ABSTRACT 
Compulsory childhood vaccination is a cornerstone of U.S. public 
health policy. All fifty states compel children to vaccinate against 
many infectious diseases to achieve so-called herd immunity, a 
scientific theory that attempts to explain how societies protect 
themselves against infectious disease. 
This Article explores both the theory and practice of herd 
immunity. The authors evaluate the scientific assumptions underlying 
the theory, how the theory applies in law, a game theory approach to 
herd immunity, and a possible framework for rational policymaking. 
The Article argues that herd immunity is unattainable for most 
diseases and is therefore an irrational goal. Instead, the authors 
conclude that herd effect is attainable and that a voluntary vaccination 
marketplace, not command-and-control compulsion, would most 
efficiently achieve that goal. 
The Article takes on the bugaboo of the citizen “free rider” who is 
out to game the system, how a vaccination marketplace might work, 
and what factors policymakers must take into account in developing 
sound policies. The Article concludes that it is time for states to adopt 
more realistic and cost-efficient laws to achieve attainable herd effect, 
not illusory herd immunity. 
INTRODUCTION 
any state and federal laws compel childhood vaccination based 
on the theory of herd immunity.1 The theory describes a form 
of indirect protection in which non-immune individuals are protected 
from those that have acquired a disease and recovered.2 Promoters of 
 
1 See James G. Hodge, Jr. & Lawrence O. Gostin, School Vaccination Requirements: 
Historical, Social, and Legal Perspectives, 90 KY. L.J. 831, 833 (2002) (“Each state has 
school vaccination laws which require children of appropriate age to be vaccinated for 
several communicable diseases.” (citation omitted)); see also State Information, 
IMMUNIZATION ACTION COALITION, http://www.immunize.org/laws (last visited Mar. 6, 
2014) (showing vaccination mandates by state, and while the Immunization Action 
Coalition is solely responsible for this website, its information is based on government 
sources, and the website is funded in part by the Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention). 
2 See, e.g., Paul Fine et al., “Herd Immunity”: A Rough Guide, 52 CLINICAL 
INFECTIOUS DISEASES 911 (2011) [hereinafter Fine, Rough Guide]; Paul E.M. Fine, Herd 
Immunity: History, Theory, Practice, 15 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVS. 265 (1993) [hereinafter 
Fine, History]; John P. Fox et al., Herd Immunity: Basic Concept and Relevance to Public 
Health Immunization Practices, 94 J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 179 (1971). 
M
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universal vaccination adopted this theory, suggesting that it applies to 
vaccine-induced immunity as well.3 Today, herd immunity is the 
central rationale for compulsory vaccination, and the U.S. Supreme 
Court has long upheld the right of states to mandate vaccines under 
certain circumstances.4 Vaccine proponents in the United States argue 
that the theory justifies vaccination of all children against vaccine-
targeted diseases, except those few children with lawful exemptions.5 
Today, at or above ninety percent of all U.S. children have been 
vaccinated against routine childhood diseases, including measles, 
mumps, and pertussis.6 
But the theory of herd immunity alone does not justify compulsion. 
The leap in logic from herd immunity theory to compulsory 
vaccination programs requires three fundamental assumptions: (1) 
that herd immunity is a valid and obtainable objective of vaccination 
policy; (2) that without compulsion, unvaccinated individuals, or their 
guardians, will seek to “free ride” on the immunity of the community; 
and (3) that individuals have an implied duty to society to be 
vaccinated to achieve herd immunity.7 This Article looks at the 
underpinnings of the herd immunity theory and at the ties binding the 
theory to compulsory laws. Is herd immunity obtainable with modern 
vaccines? Are the assumptions of the theory relevant in the real 
world? Is there a free rider problem? Do members of society, and 
children in particular, have an obligation to accept vaccines “for the 
good of the herd”? 
This Article concludes that herd immunity has only limited 
application in the world of policy. Given contemporary, imperfect 
vaccine technology and geographical and age-stratified vaccination 
mandates, herd immunity does not exist and is not attainable. 
Therefore, policy should seek to maximize attainable benefits, not 
unattainable ones, by relying on herd effect and the optimal use of 
scarce resources. 
A game theory approach suggests that a market based on individual 
vaccination choices would best protect society. Game theory refutes 
 
3 Id. 
4 See Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
5 See Hodge, Jr. & Gostin, supra note 1. 
6 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, National, State, and Local Area Vaccination 
Coverage Among Children Aged 19–35 Months—United States, 2009, 59 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1171, 1171–73 (2010), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr 
/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5936a2.htm. 
7 See Douglas S. Diekema, Choices Should Have Consequences: Failure to Vaccinate, 
Harm to Others, and Civil Liability, 107 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 90 (2009). 
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the free rider problem by showing that a unique equilibrium point 
exists that best balances vaccination benefits and disease harms. The 
Article finds that market-based, not regulatory, solutions better fit 
vaccination decision making.8 This market approach suggests that in 
the long term, individuals will appropriately balance the relative costs 
of vaccination and infection, leading people to vaccinate voluntarily 
in light of the cost-benefit analysis. Although the equilibrium 
vaccination coverage is in almost all cases lower than the herd 
immunity threshold, “soft” regulation can achieve aggregate health 
benefits for society without imposing inefficient marginal costs on 
individuals and the healthcare system.9 We therefore argue that 
personal choices in a market with adequate information would better 
allocate scarce healthcare resources, better protect the public health, 
and better respect individual autonomy. Our viewpoint may help 
explain why many developed countries, including those with political 
systems closest to our own, have only voluntary childhood 
vaccination programs. Vaccination uptake and disease levels in these 
countries, including Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and New 
Zealand, are comparable to those in the United States.10 
 
8 Such market-based approaches have been well described in the literature of 
administrative and regulatory law. See generally OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR 
A-4, at 7-9 (2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4 
(outlining alternatives to federal regulation, including specification of performance as 
opposed to design standards, use of economic incentives, and informational measures); 
Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. 
REV. 1333, 1336–37 (1985) (describing the “massive information-gathering burdens” on 
administrators attempting to impose command-and-control emissions regulations). 
9 Cf. Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(b)(3), 58 Fed. Reg. 190 (Oct. 4, 1993) (“Each agency 
shall identify and assess available alternatives to direct regulation, including providing 
economic incentives to encourage the desired behavior, such as . . . providing information 
upon which choices can be made by the public.”); id. at § 1(b)(6) (“Each agency shall 
assess both the costs and the benefits of the intended regulation and . . . propose or adopt a 
regulation only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation 
justify its costs.”); see also Exec. Order No. 13,563 § 1(b), 76 Fed. Reg. 14 (Jan. 21, 2011) 
(supplementing Exec. Order No. 12,866 and reaffirming general principles of regulatory 
policy). 
10 There is no mandatory vaccination in the United Kingdom. Childhood Immunisation: 
A Guide for Healthcare Professionals, BRIT. MED. ASS’N (June 2003), http://www 
.worcslmc.co.uk/upload/Childhood_Immunisation_June_03.pdf. Scandinavia and 
Germany also rely on voluntary vaccination rather than compulsion. Id. There are some 
vaccination requirements in Australia, but there is a broad right of conscientious objection. 
Id. Some provinces in Canada require vaccines but allow conscientious objection, and the 
country as a whole does not mandate vaccination. Vaccine Safety Frequently Asked 
Questions, PUB. HEALTH AGENCY OF CAN., http://www.phac-aspc .gc.ca/im/vs-sv/vs-
faq16-eng.php (last modified Aug. 27, 2012). In 2012, the United Kingdom, with a 
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Every state in the United States currently mandates roughly 
twenty-five to thirty-five doses of vaccines to preschoolers and 
school-aged children, with limited rights of exemption.11 While there 
are other vaccination mandates in the United States for military 
personnel, hospital workers, and university students, to name a few, 
this Article focuses exclusively on state mandates for preschoolers 
and schoolchildren. Today, if children do not comply with state 
vaccination mandates and do not have valid exemptions, they lose 
their ability to attend school, a fundamental right and obligation of 
citizenship.12 Further, state agents may charge the parents with 
medical neglect and potentially remove children to foster care for 
failure to vaccinate.13 Even if a state offers limited medical, religious, 
and philosophical exemptions, we consider its vaccination mandate to 
be compulsory for purposes of this Article. We do so because in the 
majority of states, exemptions are extremely limited,14 and even in 
those states where they exist, there are strong legislative efforts to 
curtail them.15 We note at the outset that many vaccine-related issues 
are beyond the scope of this Article. While further considerations of 
 
population of roughly 63 million, had 0 reported cases of diphtheria, 2092 reported cases 
of measles, and 3178 reported cases of mumps. WHO Vaccine-Preventable Diseases: 
Monitoring System. 2014 Global Summary, WORLD HEALTH ORG., http://apps.who.int 
/immunization_monitoring/globalsummary/ (select “United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland (the)” from the dropdown menu) (last updated July 15, 2014). Similarly, 
Australia, with a population of roughly 23 million, had 0 reported cases of diphtheria, 199 
reported cases of measles, and 195 reported cases of mumps in 2012. Id. (select 
“Australia” from the dropdown menu). In 2012, the United States, where choice is more 
limited, with a population of roughly 317 million, had 1 reported case of diphtheria, 55 
reported cases of measles, and 229 reported cases of mumps. Id. (select “United States of 
America (the)” from the dropdown menu). 
11 See States with Religious and Philosophical Exemptions from School Immunization 
Requirements, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Dec. 2012), http://www.ncsl.org 
/research/health/school-immunization-exemption-state-laws.aspx (showing that only 
Mississippi and West Virginia do not have religious exemptions). 
12 See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2164 (Consol. 2011). 
13 See Kim Mack Rosenberg, Forced Child Removal, in VACCINE EPIDEMIC: HOW 
CORPORATE GREED, BIASED SCIENCE, AND COERCIVE GOVERNMENT THREATEN OUR 
HUMAN RIGHTS, OUR HEALTH, AND OUR CHILDREN 238 (Louise Kuo Habakus & Mary 
Holland eds., 2012). 
14 See Y. Tony Yang & Vicky Debold, A Longitudinal Analysis of the Effect of 
Nonmedical Exemption Law and Vaccine Uptake on Vaccine-Targeted Disease Rates, 104 
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 371 (2014) (stating that fewer than ten percent of all children have 
exemptions). 
15 See, e.g., First Warning Letter from Jane R. Zucker, Assistant Comm’r, N.Y.C. Dep’t 
of Health & Mental Hygiene, to Principals (Nov. 8, 2012), available at http://schools.nyc 
.gov/NR/rdonlyres/1B9F9BF4-34AE-49B9-8C45-B0176A0CA970/0/FirstWarningLetter 
.pdf (threatening principals if they do not achieve 98.8% vaccination compliance). 
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personal autonomy, vaccine safety, and vaccine injury are all critical 
and interrelated, we do not consider those issues in depth here.16 
Part I defines and analyzes herd immunity and the closely related 
but distinct concept of herd effect. It contrasts disease eradication and 
elimination with control, highlighting the limits of what modern 
vaccination programs can achieve. It then explores the real world of 
disease outbreaks in vaccinated and unvaccinated populations. Part II 
introduces the Feudtner-Marcuse framework for “just” vaccination 
policy. This systematic approach highlights seven objectives of 
vaccination programs, including mandatory ones. Part III reviews 
game theory to understand the factors that drive people to choose or 
decline vaccination. We discuss a social equilibrium point that 
maximizes net public health gains. The Article ends by summarizing 
our conclusions and recommendations for U.S. vaccination policies. 
I 
HERD IMMUNITY AND ITS ASSUMPTIONS 
Herd immunity depends on the time a disease persists within an 
infected host and the rate at which the disease spreads.17 In a 
population of only susceptible individuals, the introduction of a single 
infected person will result in indiscriminate transmission to all others 
whom the infected person contacts until those infected people die or 
recover.18 The average number of people in such a susceptible 
population who become infected is the so-called basic reproduction 
number R0.19 Each of those people who contracted the disease from 
the initial infected individual is able to transmit the disease to other 
susceptible contacts; this process repeats itself until the entire 
 
16 Other sources provide more in-depth considerations of these issues. See generally 
VACCINE EPIDEMIC: HOW CORPORATE GREED, BIASED SCIENCE, AND COERCIVE 
GOVERNMENT THREATEN OUR HUMAN RIGHTS, OUR HEALTH, AND OUR CHILDREN, 
supra note 13; see also Mary Holland et al., Unanswered Questions from the Vaccine 
Injury Compensation Program: A Review of Compensated Cases of Vaccine-Induced 
Brain Injury, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 480 (2011). 
17 See J.M. Heffernan et al., Perspectives on the Basic Reproductive Ratio, 2 J. ROYAL 
SOC’Y INTERFACE 281 (2005). 
18 See Fine, History, supra note 2, at 273 fig.5 (showing one hundred percent 
transmission from one individual to all other individuals with whom he or she has 
effective contact in an entirely susceptible population). 
19 Heffernan et al., supra note 17. 
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population is infected.20 This model of disease transmission exhibits 
epidemic dynamics.21 
A. Herd Immunity Threshold 
By contrast, consider the case where a certain fraction  of the 
population has immunity to the disease. If a single infected individual 
comes into the population, the average number of secondary 
infections from transmission is then R0(1-).22 If R0(1-) < 1, then the 
disease on average will not spread to other susceptible people.23 This 
means that the disease is likely to die out either through the host’s 
death or recovery before further spread.24 The threshold H of 
immune individuals to create these circumstances is H = 1-1/R0, or 
the herd immunity threshold.25 The underlying rationale for mass 
vaccination policies is to ensure that the fraction of immune 
individuals in society is above the herd immunity threshold, thus 
eliminating the disease from the population.26 The moral of the herd 
immunity story, though, is that not every individual needs to be 
immune to provide protection to the society as a whole.27 
B. Herd Effect 
The concept of herd immunity refers to the complete removal of a 
disease from society; so long as any member of the population has 
immunity to the disease, however, the disease’s ability to spread 
 
20 See Fine, History, supra note 2 (showing the complete spread of infection in an 
entirely susceptible society). 
21 See id. at 269 (defining the epidemic threshold for a simple mass-action model of 
infectious dynamics). 
22 To derive this relationship, note that within a susceptible population of size N, a 
single infectious individual will infect on average R0 persons. If NV members of the 
population have immunity to the disease, however, then transmission is only possible 
within a subpopulation of size N-NV. The resulting average number of secondary infections 
then decreases to (R0/N)(N-NV) = R0(1-NV/N) = R0(1-).  
23 See Heffernan et al., supra note 17, at 281–87. 
24 Id. 
25 See generally Fine, History, supra note 2, at 269 (providing one example of use of 
the herd immunity threshold); Fine, Rough Guide, supra note 2, at 912 fig.1 (providing 
another example of use of the herd immunity threshold). 
26 See Fine, Rough Guide, supra note 2 (discussing the success of vaccination programs 
against measles, mumps, rubella, etc. in delaying or averting epidemics by keeping the 
amount of susceptible individuals below the threshold); see also Fine, History, supra note 
2 (discussing the success of the global smallpox eradication program). 
27 See Fine, History, supra note 2. 
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lessens.28 This decrease in the rate of epidemic transmission is the 
herd effect.29 Even if herd immunity itself is not achievable, society 
still benefits from a “buffer” of immune individuals in order to 
mitigate disease.30 Although the concepts of herd immunity and herd 
effect are sometimes interchangeable, they describe different aspects 
of the immunity puzzle—whereas herd immunity aims to eliminate a 
disease from society, herd effect refers to infection control.31 Since 
the 1960s, compulsory state vaccination programs have achieved herd 
effects for specific diseases, but none has achieved herd immunity. 
We maintain the analytic distinction between these terms in the 
discussion below. 
C. The Free Rider Problem 
Why are universal mandatory vaccination policies necessary if we 
can achieve herd immunity by vaccinating only a fraction of the 
population? Proponents of compulsion argue that if vaccination is not 
mandatory, then herd immunity is generally unattainable due to a free 
rider problem.32 From the perspective of an individual weighing the 
decision to vaccinate, it is in her best interest not to vaccinate because 
she is unlikely to become sick if all others are immune and are 
unlikely to transmit disease.33 This decision-maker could then “free 
ride” on the immunity of others.34 
If all individuals in a population attempt to free ride, then they all 
run the risk of illness. If the expected risks of vaccine injury outweigh 
those of illness, then no one will choose to vaccinate.35 This situation 
 
28 See T. Jacob John & Reuben Samuel, Herd Immunity and Herd Effect: New Insights 
and Definitions, 16 EUR. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 601, 601 (2000) (defining herd effect). 
29 See id. (distinguishing herd effect and herd immunity). 
30 See Fine, Rough Guide, supra note 2, at 912 (discussing the importance of “selective 
vaccination”—specifically, vaccinating groups that play an important role in transmission, 
either in slowing transmission or reducing incidence among the entire population). 
31 See infra Part I.F. (discussing definitions of “control” and “elimination” in the 
context of vaccination policy). 
32 See Fine, Rough Guide, supra note 2, at 914. 
33 See id. 
34 See id. 
35 It is essential to distinguish between perceived and absolute costs of vaccination and 
infection. In general, individuals in society operate under limited information as to the 
probabilities of vaccine-related harm and infection and thus make individual estimations of 
expected costs consistent with such incomplete information. If all members of society had 
perfect information, absolute costs of vaccination and infection could be determined. In 
practice, such perfect information is never available. See infra Part III. 
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represents a tragedy of the commons, in which society loses an 
important benefit because of competing individual interests.36 As the 
rate of infection decreases, individuals may perceive the risks of 
infection as declining, inducing some individuals to forego 
vaccination. This scenario has led some to decry that vaccines are the 
“victim[s] of their own success.”37 Compulsory vaccination is then 
one solution to the potential free rider problem because it forces all 
children to assume part of the collective responsibility to prevent 
infectious disease.38 
D. Assumptions Underlying Herd Immunity Theory 
The potential social costs of the free rider problem are severe in the 
face of a highly infectious, life-threatening disease and the failure to 
reach the herd immunity threshold.39 Under what conditions, 
however, is herd immunity actually possible? Many of the underlying 
assumptions of herd immunity may be irrelevant in the real world, as 
authoritative scientists have acknowledged.40 We address the 
following core assumptions of the theory41: 
1. Population homogeneity; 
2. Well-mixing of the population; 
3. Random vaccination of individuals; 
4. Perfect vaccine efficacy; and 
5. Age uniformity in the population. 
 
36 See Chris T. Bauch et al., Rapid Emergence of Free-Riding Behavior in New 
Pediatric Immunization Programs, 5 PLOS ONE 1, 1 (2010). 
37 See Matthew Janko, Vaccination: A Victim of Its Own Success, 14 VIRTUAL MENTOR 
3, 4 (2012). 
38 Dagobert L. Brito et al., Externalities and Compulsory Vaccinations, 45 J. PUB. 
ECON. 69, 69–70 (1991) (quoting J.E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR 210 
(2d ed. 1988)). 
39 See, e.g., V.A.A. Jansen et al., Measles Outbreaks in a Population with Declining 
Vaccine Uptake, 301 SCIENCE 804, 804 (2003) (relating the decline in measles 
vaccinations to “a number of large measles outbreaks”). 
40 See Fine, History, supra note 2, at 276. 
41 See id. (naming an incomplete list of assumptions); see also Fine, Rough Guide, 
supra note 2, at 912–14 (discussing probable complexities that would upset the core 
assumptions). 
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1. The Assumption of Population Homogeneity 
Population homogeneity involves two related but distinct concepts: 
(1) compositional homogeneity and (2) spatial homogeneity.42 
Compositional homogeneity means that all individuals belong to a 
single identifiable group.43 Persons within this group transmit the 
disease among themselves as if all group members are the same.44 
Compositional homogeneity ignores racial, sociological, economic, 
and genetic differences, all of which in the real world may affect 
resistance to an infectious disease.45 
Spatial homogeneity, by contrast, refers to the degree of uniform 
spread over a geographic region.46 Spatial homogeneity assumes that 
people behave identically in spreading disease.47 But if a group of 
people lives in a particular area, and its members spread disease 
differently from the rest of society, then this violates the assumption 
of interchangeability.48 For the simple analysis of herd immunity to 
hold true, both compositional and spatial homogeneity must exist.49 
As a practical matter, however, compositional homogeneity never 
holds. Social stratification by age, ethnicity, class, gender, race, and 
sexual orientation, among other factors, results in differing individual 
risks.50 For example, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) noted that more than fifty percent of all new cases of HIV 
infection between 2006 and 2009 were among men who have sex 
 
42 See generally DIETRICH STOYAN ET AL., STOCHASTIC GEOMETRY AND ITS 
APPLICATIONS (2d ed. 1995) (discussing spatial homogeneity in the context of stochastic 





46 See generally STOYAN ET AL., supra note 42. 
47 Spatial homogeneity is mathematically defined by the property of translation-
invariance for all probabilistic descriptors governing the spatial correlations among groups 
of individuals within a population, implying that the choice of origin for a Euclidean 
coordinate system adopted to describe the spatial region does not affect measured 
statistical properties. 
48 Fine, Rough Guide, supra note 2, at 913. 
49 Id. (listing heterogeneous populations as a complex problem disrupting herd 
immunity’s core assumptions). 
50 See generally CDC Fact Sheet: Estimates of New HIV Infections in the United States, 
2006–2009, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION 1, 3 (Aug. 2011), 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchhstp/newsroom/docs/Hiv-infections-2006-2009.pdf (providing 
statistics showing disparities in HIV outbreaks among differing populations). 
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with men.51 Additionally, African Americans accounted for forty-four 
percent of new HIV infections in 2009.52 These types of differences 
are compositional, relating to characteristics that distinguish 
population subgroups. Compositional heterogeneity increases the herd 
immunity threshold for the population, meaning that the minimum 
number of people vaccinated must be higher, because vaccination of 
low-risk individuals provides little marginal herd effect. 
Spatial homogeneity, another bedrock assumption of herd 
immunity, similarly does not hold true in practice.53 Scientists have 
studied the effects of clustering using network models, showing 
individuals as nodes on a graph with intersections indicating 
transmissible contacts.54 Limiting the types and numbers of 
transmissible contacts can substantially change the rate at which a 
disease spreads through the population.55 The existence of isolated, 
highly clustered groups of susceptible individuals can increase the 
required herd immunity threshold for the population as a whole 
because vaccinating people outside the clustered group provides little 
benefit. 
Diseases spread more slowly when there is more distance between 
people.56 This spatial effect can result in rapid disease spread within 
clustered areas, such as cities, even when disease spread is decreasing 
overall.57 As travel technology continues to develop, diseases can 
spread quickly, both domestically and internationally. However, 
spatial dissemination coupled with transmission dynamics may lead to 
 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 4. 
53 See Martial L. Ndeffo Mbah et al., The Impact of Imitation on Vaccination Behavior 
in Social Contact Networks, 8 PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY 1, 7 (2012) (noting that 
spatial homogeneity fails to take into account the fact that “individuals frequently imitate 
others”). 
54 See generally Chris T. Bauch & Alison P. Galvani, Using Network Models to 
Approximate Spatial Point-Process Models, 184 MATHEMATICAL BIOSCIENCES 101 
(2003) (using network models to evaluate spatial effects on ecological and epidemiological 
systems); Matt J. Keeling & Ken T.D. Eames, Networks and Epidemic Models, 2 J. ROYAL 
SOC’Y INTERFACE 295 (2005) (providing an overview of the process of approximating a 
network); Martial L. Ndeffo Mbah et al., supra note 53 (using network-based models to 
examine the correlation between the spread of disease and social contacts). 
55 Keeling & Eames, supra note 54, at 300–01 (contrasting networking models that 
account for clustering with random networks, which assume that connections are formed at 
random). 
56 See Bauch & Galvani, supra note 54, at 102. 
57 Id. 
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stationary patterns of infectious regions.58 In sum, neither 
compositional nor spatial homogeneity assumptions hold true in the 
real world. 
2. The Assumption of a Well-Mixed Population 
The well-mixing assumption refers to the notion that all susceptible 
individuals are equally likely to become sick from an infectious 
individual.59 Network models can test the well-mixing assumption 
and, in a well-mixed population, each node in a network model will 
have an intersection with every other node in that same model.60 To 
understand how well-mixing affects the dynamics, consider the 
simple case of a population of nine individuals, three of whom are 
susceptible and six of whom are infected. If each infected individual 
contacts only one susceptible person, and if each susceptible person 
contacts two infected people, it follows that there are only six possible 
transmissible contacts in the population. 
By contrast, the well-mixing assumption implies that there are 
eighteen transmissible contacts, overestimating the disease 
propagation rate by a factor of three. Isolated groups of highly 
connected, susceptible people may face particularly rapid disease 
transmission that might otherwise have spread relatively slowly 
through the population as a whole.61 Clustering of susceptible 
individuals is again the key to understanding how to control disease 
dynamics. Indeed, all statewide mandates are for children and young 
adults, representing clusterings of susceptible individuals. No states 
mandate vaccination for the entire population today. The result of this 
 
58 This pattern-forming phenomenon arises from an identical mechanism for the 
formation of so-called Turing patterns in reaction-diffusion chemical systems. Such 
patterns, which are stationary in time but heterogeneous in space, develop when an 
“inhibiting” species diffuses faster in space than a competing “growth” species, resulting 
in local activation of dynamic transmission that is inhibited on a global scale. See A.M. 
Turing, The Chemical Basis of Morphogenesis, 237 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y 
LONDON 37, 57–58 (1952). 
59 James Holland Jones, Notes on R0, DEP’T ANTHROPOLOGICAL SCI. STANFORD U. 1, 
2 (2007), http://www.stanford.edu/~jhj1/teachingdocs/Jones-on-R0.pdf. 
60 Alun L. Lloyd et al., Infection Dynamics on Small-World Networks, in 
MATHEMATICAL STUDIES ON HUMAN DISEASE DYNAMICS: EMERGING PARADIGMS AND 
CHALLENGES 209, 220–21 (Contemporary Mathematics Ser. Vol. 412, Abba B. Gumel et 
al. eds., 2006). 
61 See Fine, Rough Guide, supra note 2, at 913–14. 
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type of clustering is that the herd immunity threshold may be higher 
than estimated from the well-mixing assumption.62 
U.S. policies for hepatitis B disease prevention provide a good 
example of how the well-mixing assumption applies in practice.63 
Although only a small portion of the U.S. population was at risk of 
contracting hepatitis B, namely intravenous drug users, those who had 
unprotected sex with multiple partners, and infants of hepatitis B 
positive mothers, it proved difficult for public health authorities to 
gain compliance among these target groups in the 1980s.64 As a 
result, even though the herd immunity threshold would be much 
lower for the general population than the target group, U.S. public 
health authorities recommended universal vaccination of infants 
against hepatitis B to achieve herd immunity, and forty-seven states 
now mandate the vaccine.65 
3. The Assumption of Random Vaccination of Individuals 
In a heterogeneous population, different subgroups may face 
unique risks to certain infections and vaccine injuries.66 A vaccination 
program that randomly immunizes people will generally require an 
especially high vaccination coverage ratio to achieve herd immunity 
because the disease will be able to propagate efficiently among high-
risk individuals.67 One solution is therefore to target the vaccination 
 
62 See id. at 913. 
63 See Mary Holland, Compulsory Vaccination, the Constitution, and the Hepatitis B 
Mandate for Infants and Young Children, 12 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 39, 41 
(2012); Rui Xu & Zhien Ma, An HBV Model with Diffusion and Time Delay, 257 J. 
THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 499, 499 (noting that “it is implicitly assumed that cells and 
viruses are well mixed”). 
64 Holland, supra note 63, at 68–69 (citing Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, 
Recommendation of the Immunization Practices Advisory Committee (ACIP) Inactivated 
Hepatitis B Virus Vaccine, 31 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 317 (1982), 
available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00001116.htm) (outlining 
recommendations of U.S. public health authorities that “higher-risk groups” receive 
hepatitis B vaccinations). 
65 See Hepatitis B Prevention Mandates for Daycare and K-12, IMMUNIZATION 
ACTION COALITION, http://www.immunize.org/laws/hepb.asp (last updated May 26, 
2011). 
66 See People at High Risk of Developing Flu-Related Complications, CTRS. FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/about/disease/high_risk.htm 
(last updated Nov. 7, 2013) (listing specific subgroups that are particularly susceptible to 
flu-related complications). 
67 See Fine, Rough Guide, supra note 2, at 914. 
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program only to those individuals who are at a highest risk of 
infection.68 
Fine provides a simple example of this type of targeted vaccination 
program by considering a sample population composed of two equal-
sized subgroups: high-risk and low-risk.69 Following Fine’s analysis, 
assume that each individual in the high-risk group, if infected, would 
infect five other high-risk members, and each low-risk individual, if 
infected, would infect one other low-risk member.70 Under this 
idealized scheme, the high-risk and low-risk dynamics are separable 
because there are no transmissible contacts between groups.71 The 
disease among the low-risk group is controllable without vaccination 
because the reproduction rate, R0(LR), for the low-risk group is one, 
meaning that each person in this group would infect one other person 
on average.72 This implies that the herd immunity threshold within 
the low-risk group is zero, and the disease will not spread, or H(LR) = 
0.73 
By contrast, the disease will exhibit epidemic dynamics among the 
high-risk group because each high-risk individual will on average 
infect five others, so R0(HR) = 5 and H(HR) = 0.8.74 If vaccination is 
only for the high-risk group, only 80% of that group needs to receive 
the vaccine to induce herd immunity in the population as a whole.75 
Surprisingly, such a program targeted only at high-risk individuals 
would require vaccinating only 40% of the total population, 
representing a substantial increase in the health of society at lower 
financial cost and risk of vaccine injury.76 But a vaccination program 
that randomly vaccinated 80% of the total population from the high-
risk and low-risk groups would not provide herd immunity at all 
 
68 See Holland, supra note 63, at 68 (targeting hepatitis B vaccinations to high-risk 
groups). 
69 Fine, Rough Guide, supra note 2, at 914. 
70 Id. 
71 See id. 
72 See id. 
73 Some care is required here. If R0 = 1 exactly, then the disease will exist in an 
endemic steady state in which the number of infected individuals neither increases nor 
decreases on average. We therefore assume without loss of generality that the basic 
reproduction number is actually infinitesimally smaller than one to ensure that the disease 
is unable to sustain itself. 
74 Fine, Rough Guide, supra note 2, at 914. 
75 Id. 
76 See id. 
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because the fractional vaccination coverage for the high-risk 
population would be less than its required herd immunity threshold.77 
Although society can achieve the greatest benefits by targeting 
high-risk groups, such a policy imposes the full costs of vaccination 
on one identifiable group while the benefits diffuse to the greater 
population.78 One could characterize this program as imposing a tax 
on specific individuals based on inherent characteristics,79 precluding 
an equitable distribution of the costs and benefits to society. This 
policy becomes particularly troubling when its targets are children, 
who are low-risk subjects, selected for convenience, as in the case 
with mandatory vaccination of schoolchildren against hepatitis B, a 
sexually transmitted disease.80 Random vaccination fails to maximize 
herd immunity or herd effect; only targeted or universal vaccination 
can achieve that result. 
4. The Assumption of Perfect Vaccine Efficacy 
Vaccines do not induce immunity perfectly; they usually fail in a 
certain fraction of people for a variety of reasons.81 Furthermore, as a 
practical matter, vaccine “efficacy” is highly uncertain.82 Scientists 
refer to efficacy as the relative fractional decrease in the rate of 
disease transmission between unvaccinated and vaccinated 
individuals in double-blind, randomized, clinically-controlled 
studies.83 By contrast, the concept of vaccine “effectiveness” refers to 
the performance of the vaccine in the “real world,” outside of clinical 
trials.84 This distinction is not necessarily clear because the goal of 
 
77 See id. 
78 See id. (discussing potential equal rights violations in mandating that all young 
children receive the hepatitis B vaccine). 
79 Indeed, the Supreme Court’s recent extension of the taxation power in the Court’s 
ruling on the Affordable Care Act suggests that such a tax may be constitutional. See Nat’l 
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2599 (2012) (holding that the 
Constitution does not protect individuals from “taxation through inactivity”). 
80 See Holland, supra note 63, at 41. 
81 See Flu Vaccine Effectiveness: Questions and Answers for Health Professionals, 
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/flu/professionals 
/vaccination/effectivenessqa.htm (last updated Nov. 27, 2013) (finding, for example, that 
influenza vaccines are less effective in people with chronic, high-risk medical conditions). 
82 John Clemens et al., Evaluating New Vaccines for Developing Countries: Efficacy or 
Effectiveness?, 275 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 390, 392 (1996). 
83 See Geoffrey A. Weinberg & Peter G. Szilagyi, Vaccine Epidemiology: Efficacy, 
Effectiveness, and the Translational Research Roadmap, 201 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 
1607 (2010); Fine, Rough Guide, supra note 2, at 913 tbl.1; Flu Vaccine Effectiveness: 
Questions and Answers for Health Professionals, supra note 81. 
84 Weinberg & Szilagyi, supra note 83, at 1608. 
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any vaccination policy is to control the rate of disease transmission. 
Nevertheless, either definition is sufficient for our discussion of herd 
immunity. 
If a fraction, , of the vaccinated population fails to develop 
immunity and thus remains susceptible to infection, then the fraction 
of the total population that must receive the vaccine to ensure herd 
immunity is H = (1-1/R0)/ = H/.85 If the fraction of the population 
that fails to develop immunity is greater than the herd immunity 
threshold, or  < H, then herd immunity is theoretically impossible, 
even if the entire population is vaccinated.86 A herd immunity 
threshold, H, is generally high, ranging from 80%–99%.87 For 
example, Fine estimates that the threshold for measles is 83%–94% 
and pertussis is 92%–94%.88 As an illustration of the problem, 
measles vaccine has an estimated vaccine efficacy rate of 85%–95% 
for the first dose given to babies between 12 and 15 months.89 This 
leaves unclear whether herd immunity is even theoretically achievable 
for measles. Thus, the assumption of perfect vaccine efficacy has 
limited bearing in real-world conditions. 
5. The Assumption of Age Uniformity 
Modern immunization programs target infants and young children 
for both scientific and practical reasons. Experience and science 
suggest that children are more vulnerable to infectious disease, but the 
practical reasons are also compelling.90 Linking recommended and 
compulsory vaccination to “well-baby” and school check-ups 
provides a relatively low-cost method to oversee vaccination 
compliance. Adults, by contrast, lead more diverse lives and are more 
 
85 See generally Fine, History, supra note 2. 
86 Id. 
87 See Fine, History, supra note 2, at 268 (providing estimates of the herd immunity 
thresholds for the following diseases: diphtheria (85%); malaria (80%–99%); measles 
(83%–94%); mumps (75%–86%); pertussis (92%–94%); polio (80%–86%); rubella (83%–
85%); smallpox (80%–85%)); see also Fine, Rough Guide, supra note 2, at 913. It should 
be noted that there is scientific uncertainty regarding the precise values of the herd 
immunity thresholds for various diseases. 
88 Fine, History, supra note 2, at 268. 
89 Canadian Immunization Guide: Measles Vaccine, PUB. HEALTH AGENCY CAN., 
http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/publicat/cig-gci/p04-meas-roug-eng.php (last modified Oct. 9, 
2013); Fine, History, supra note 2, at 268 tbl.1. 
90 See Gaston De Serres & Bernard Duval, Pertussis Vaccination Beyond Childhood, 
365 LANCET 1015, 1015 (2005). 
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likely to assert autonomy rights in the courts and through political 
participation than young children or their parents.91 
Children face particular problems from waning vaccine-induced 
immunity.92 Immunity from vaccines generally requires several 
boosters to extend the period of protection. Adults, who may be less 
likely to receive boosters, have a greater fraction of susceptible 
individuals as a group than children.93 Furthermore, unlike in prior 
decades, younger adults today do not have naturally acquired 
immunity because they never had infectious childhood diseases. Why 
then does the disease not produce an epidemic among adults? Are 
adults free riding on the vaccination programs of children? 
We gain some insight into this question by comparing the differing 
vaccination policies for pertussis in European countries and the 
United States in the 1980s.94 European countries had little or no 
pertussis immunization in childhood, resulting in widespread pertussis 
transmission among infants and children, but few adolescent or adult 
cases due to long-lasting natural immunity.95 By contrast, the United 
States consistently administered pertussis vaccines to infants and 
children in the 1980s, causing an increase in pertussis cases among 
adults and adolescents because temporary vaccine-induced immunity 
had waned.96 Therefore, while the adult population is not completely 
free riding on the vaccination of children, vaccinating children may 
have the unintended effect of increasing the average age when people 
become infected. For example, while chickenpox is a relatively mild 
disease among children, it can have extremely serious consequences 
in high-risk populations, including pregnant women, the elderly, and 
those who have compromised immunity.97 Society may be 
disadvantaged by vaccinating children early, thus creating conditions 
 
91 See generally Peter A. Briss et al., Reviews of Evidence Regarding Interventions to 
Improve Vaccination Coverage in Children, Adolescents, and Adults, 18 AM. J. 
PREVENTATIVE MED. 97 (2000). 
92 Id. 
93 See generally Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Noninfluenza Vaccination 
Coverage Among Adults—United States, 2011, 62 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 
66 (2013), available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6204a2.htm?s 
_cid=mm6204a2_w. 
94 De Serres & Duval, supra note 90, at 1015–16. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Chickenpox (Varicella): People at High Risk for Complications, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/chickenpox/hcp/high-risk.html (last 
updated Nov. 16, 2011). 
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where older adults acquire the illness with greater risk of 
complications.98 
While herd immunity assumes age uniformity, in practice this is 
virtually never present in real-world vaccination programs.99 
Overwhelmingly, children are the targets of mandatory vaccination 
programs, and this lack of age uniformity poses significant challenges 
given the temporary nature of vaccine protection.100 
*** 
In sum, the five underlying assumptions at the foundation of herd 
immunity—population homogeneity, well-mixing, random 
vaccination, perfect vaccine efficacy, and age uniformity—are of 
exceedingly limited practical relevance. The following cases highlight 
these limitations in practice. 
E. Herd Immunity Theory in Practice 
Recent experience shows infectious disease outbreaks in highly 
vaccinated populations. Such outbreaks seeming to violate the herd 
immunity theory have caused many researchers to reject the theory 
altogether. For instance, the International Medical Council on 
Vaccination states in its “Principles and Findings,” that “[w]e find the 
premise of herd immunity to be a faulty theory.”101 Dr. Russell 
Blaylock argues that “[h]erd immunity is mostly a myth and applies 
only to natural immunity—that is, contracting the infection itself.”102 
Dr. Suzanne Humphries argues that “[s]ince the beginning of 
vaccination, there is little proof that vaccines are responsible for 
eradicating disease even when herd immunity vaccination levels have 
 
98 See Timothy C. Reluga et al., Optimal Timing of Disease Transmission in an Age-
Structured Population, 69 BULL. MATHEMATICAL BIOLOGY 2711, 2719 (2007) 
(suggesting that foregoing vaccination at a young age may provide greater aggregate social 
health benefits). 
99 See Briss et al., supra note 91. 
100 Id. 
101 Principles and Findings, INT’L MED. COUNCIL ON VACCINATION, http://www 
.vaccinationcouncil.org/about/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2014). 
102 Russell Blaylock, The Deadly Impossibility of Herd Immunity Through Vaccination, 
INT’L MED. COUNCIL ON VACCINATION (Feb. 18, 2012), http://www.vaccinationcouncil 
.org/2012/02/18/the-deadly-impossibility-of-herd-immunity-through-vaccination-by-dr      
-russell-blaylock/. 
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been reached.”103 Dr. Tetyana Obukhanych explains that “[t]he 
absence of viral epidemics in the [United States] is due to the absence 
of endemic viral exposure, not due to . . . herd immunity, and sporadic 
outbreaks . . . occur due to . . . viral exposure brought from 
abroad.”104 
While these researchers acknowledge that vaccinations can create 
short-term immunity, and that vaccines can cause herd effect, they 
argue that vaccination’s long-term effects are often harmful to 
individuals and society. Despite nearly three hundred years of 
vaccination, scientists have not rigorously compared the long-term 
health outcomes of vaccinated versus unvaccinated subjects.105 
Without such critical information, some scientists are profoundly 
skeptical of current vaccine policies, including the goal of vaccine-
induced herd immunity.106 
Below, we consider empirical examples illustrating a range of 
problems with herd immunity in practice. They include: (1) primary 
vaccine failure—when a vaccine initially fails to induce immunity; 
(2) secondary vaccine failure—when the immunity the vaccine 
induced has waned over time and no longer offers protection; (3) 
mutation of the infectious virus—suggesting that the vaccine itself 
may have contributed to the viral shift; (4) importation of viral 
infections “just a plane ride away”; and (5) disease transmission, or 
“viral shedding,” by vaccinated people who show no symptoms of 
disease. In addition, there have been disease outbreaks in vaccinated 
populations that scientists simply cannot explain. While there are 
many examples, we will focus on the measles and varicella 
vaccination programs. 
 
103 Suzanne Humphries, “Herd Immunity.” The Flawed Science and Failures of Mass 
Vaccination, INT’L MED. COUNCIL ON VACCINATION (July 5, 2012), http://www 
.vaccinationcouncil.org/2012/07/05/herd-immunity-the-flawed-science-and-failures-of      
-mass-vaccination-suzanne-humphries-md-3/#sthash.aRBEJNVz.dpuf. 
104 TETYANA OBUKHANYCH, VACCINE ILLUSION: HOW VACCINATION COMPROMISES 
OUR NATURAL IMMUNITY AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO REGAIN OUR HEALTH 90 (2012). 
105 However, a bipartisan bill introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives on April 
25, 2013, cited as the “Vaccine Safety Study Act,” seeks to “conduct or support a 
comprehensive study comparing total health outcomes, including risk of autism, in 
vaccinated populations in the United States with such outcomes in unvaccinated 
populations in the United States.” H.R. 1757, 113th Cong. (2013), available at 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr1757/text. Although this bill only has a one 
percent chance of being enacted according to GovTrack.us, its purpose is to fund science 
that needs to be done to compare vaccinated versus unvaccinated health outcomes. H.R. 
1757: Vaccine Safety Study Act, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills 
/113/hr1757 (last visited Mar. 14, 2014). 
106 See, e.g., Principles and Findings, supra note 101. 
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1. The Case of Measles Vaccination and Immunity 
Before the United States embarked on state mandates for measles 
vaccination, one of the leading proponents of the vaccine, Alexander 
Langmuir, characterized the disease as a “self-limiting infection of 
short duration, moderate severity, and low fatality.”107 In the same 
article, he noted that the disease had maintained a “remarkably stable 
biological balance over the centuries,” and that “[t]he decline in 
mortality demonstrates the degree to which we have adapted to this 
balance and have learned to live with this parasite.”108 He explained 
that measles vaccination was by no means an urgent public health 
necessity, but rather he sought measles eradication because “it can be 
done.”109 In the 1960s, Langmuir seemed to believe that vaccination 
policies could eradicate measles in the near term. 
a. Measles Outbreaks in Highly Vaccinated Populations 
At that time, scientists believed the herd immunity threshold to be 
70% and that one dose of the vaccine would confer long-lasting 
immunity.110 Over time, however, scientists pushed the herd 
immunity threshold up to 95%111 and started requiring two doses of 
the vaccine.112 Evidence suggests, however, that even these policies 
have not been enough to create herd immunity. During a 1985 
measles outbreak in a Texas high school, more than 99% of the 1806 
students in the school had been vaccinated against measles.113 Upon 
testing, only 4.1% of the students, or 74 of them, lacked detectable 
antibodies due to either primary or secondary vaccine failure.114 The 
authors concluded, “outbreaks of measles can occur in secondary 
 
107 Alexander D. Langmuir et al., The Importance of Measles as a Health Problem, 52 
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1, 1 (1962). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 3 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
110 Fine, History, supra note 2, at 285 (showing that as late as 1982, the World Health 
Organization estimated the herd immunity threshold for measles to be 70%). 
111 Id. 
112 See Immunization Schedules: Recommended Immunization Schedule for Persons 
Aged 0 Through 18 Years, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc 
.gov/vaccines/schedules/hcp/imz/child-adolescent.html (last updated Jan. 31, 2014) 
(stating that children should receive two doses of the measles-mumps-rubella vaccine by 
six years of age). 
113 Tracy L. Gustafson et al., Measles Outbreak in a Fully Immunized Secondary-
School Population, 316 NEW ENGL. J. MED. 771, 771 (1987). 
114 Id. at 772. 
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schools, even when more than 99[%] of the students have been 
vaccinated and more than 95[%] are immune,” that is, they have 
measles antibodies.115 They acknowledged that such an outbreak 
should have been virtually impossible but rationalized that the “[r]ates 
of primary vaccine failure in this range [eds.: 4.1%] are expected.”116 
Another measles outbreak occurred in a 100% vaccinated school 
population in Illinois in 1984: 
The affected high school had 276 students and was in the same 
building as a junior high school with 135 students. A review of 
health records in the high school showed that all 411 students had 
documentation of measles vaccination on or after their first 
birthday, in accordance with Illinois law.117 
Not all students became ill, but scientists noted that those students 
who had received vaccines within the previous ten years were less 
likely to become sick than those who had been vaccinated more than 
ten years earlier.118 Notably, officials could not explain how the 
seventeen-year-old index patient came down with the measles.119 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s editors noted 
several possible reasons for the outbreak, including vaccine failure 
due to improper storage, vaccination of infants younger than one who 
might be less likely to acquire protection, and other factors.120 Still, 
they concluded that “these risk factors did not adequately explain the 
occurrence of this outbreak.”121 They further noted, “this outbreak 
suggests that measles transmission can occur within the 2%–10% of 
expected vaccine failures.”122 In other words, they acknowledged that 
even with 100% vaccination, they could not ensure herd immunity 
with existing vaccine technology and stated explicitly that “[t]his 
outbreak demonstrates that transmission of measles can occur within 
 
115 Id. at 771. 
116 Id. at 773. 
117 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Measles Outbreak Among Vaccinated High 
School Students–Illinois, 33 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 349 (1984), available 
at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00000359.htm [hereinafter Measles 
Outbreak]; see generally Benjamin M. Nkowane et al., Measles Outbreak in a Vaccinated 
School Population: Epidemiology, Chains of Transmission and the Role of Vaccine 
Failures, 77 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 434 (1987) (describing a 1984 outbreak in a 
Massachusetts high school with a 98% immunization level, providing evidence that 
outbreaks may occur in highly immunized populations). 
118 Measles Outbreak, supra note 117, at 350. 
119 Id. at 349. 
120 Id. at 350. 
121 Id. 
122 Id. (citations omitted). 
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a school population with a documented immunization level of 
100%.”123 
b. Actual and Perceived Outbreaks in Unvaccinated Populations 
Measles outbreaks have also occurred among the unvaccinated. A 
recent example happened in 2013 in a largely intentionally 
unvaccinated Hasidic community in Brooklyn, New York, when a 
teenager returned from abroad with subclinical measles.124 Fifty-eight 
members of the Orthodox Jewish community became infected, the 
largest outbreak in the United States since 1996.125 No one died, and 
no one outside the religious community became infected, but many of 
those who became ill had in fact been vaccinated.126 
Sometimes, public health officials and others have blamed disease 
outbreaks on vaccine critics. Some have blamed Dr. Andrew 
Wakefield for measles outbreaks; in February 1998, he suggested that 
there might be a causal link between the MMR vaccine, 
gastrointestinal disease, and autism.127 Having observed a new 
syndrome of gastrointestinal disease and autism in some children after 
vaccination with the MMR, he publicly recommended that parents 
consider using the single measles vaccine rather than the combination 
vaccine.128 At the time he made the recommendation, a single 
measles vaccine was available. A few months later, the United 
Kingdom government took the single measles vaccine off the market. 
 
123 Id. 
124 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Notes from the Field: Measles Outbreak 
Among Members of a Religious Community – Brooklyn, New York, March–June 2013, 62 
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 752, 752 (2013) http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr 
/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6236a5.htm; see also Renee Ghert-Zand, Measles Vaccine 




127 A.J. Wakefield et al., Ileal-Lymphoid-Nodular Hyperplasia, Non-Specific Colitis, 
and Pervasive Developmental Disorder in Children, 351 LANCET 637 (1998), retracted, 
Feb. 2, 2010, for reasons related to patient referrals and ethics committee approvals, not 
scientific fraud, available at http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet /article/PIIS0140-
6736(97)11096-0/abstract (last visited Mar. 9, 2014). For a discussion of the article and 
subsequent retraction, see Mary Holland, Who is Dr. Andrew Wakefield, in VACCINE 
EPIDEMIC, supra note 13, at 311–19; David Lewis, The Exoneration of Professor Walker-
Smith, in VACCINE EPIDEMIC, supra note 13, at 320–38. 
128 F. Edward Yazbak, Measles in the United Kingdom: The “Wakefield Factor,” 
VACCINATION NEWS, http://www.vaccinationnews.com/measles-united-kingdom-wake 
field-factor (last visited Mar. 9, 2014). 
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Many in the media have argued vociferously that Dr. Wakefield’s 
public statement caused measles outbreaks in the United Kingdom.129 
There is little data to support such assertions. In a careful review of 
United Kingdom data on measles in the ten years preceding Dr. 
Wakefield’s statement and the ten years after, Dr. Yazbak notes that 
there were 188,483 reported measles cases in the ten years before 
1998, compared to 28,289 cases in the ten years after, an 85% 
decrease.130 Comparing the five years before and after 1998 also 
showed a 67% decline, suggesting that there was little or no 
“Wakefield Factor” for reported measles cases.131 
Dr. Yazbak notes that measles outbreaks were occurring at about 
the same time in other countries. He points out that in Saudi Arabia, 
where vaccination rates were between 95% and 98%, there were 4648 
cases of measles in 2007 compared to 373 in 2005.132 The rate of 
infection was considerably higher in Saudi Arabia than the United 
Kingdom, and despite media sensationalism, rates of measles 
infection in the United Kingdom have declined steadily overall.133 
c. Potential Explanations for Outbreaks in Highly Vaccinated 
Populations 
Some argue that outbreaks in highly vaccinated populations are 
possible because mass vaccination creates “quasi-sterile 
environment[s].”134 “[C]onstant re-infection cycles have an essential 
role in building a stable herd immunity. In a population that is not 
constantly exposed to the infection . . . a serious risk of re-emerging 
infections may arise.”135 In other words, young children’s infections 
play a critical role in continually boosting the entire population’s 
immunity. On measles, Dr. Humphries observes: 
Susceptible age groups have essentially traded places since 
vaccinating. What used to happen with measles is that infants were 
protected by maternal antibodies, adults were protected by 
continued exposure, and infected children handled the disease 
normally and became immune for long periods of time. So, while 
 
129 Id.; see also Holland, supra note 127; Lewis, supra note 127. 




134 Humphries, supra note 103. 
135 Id. (citing A.A. Navarini et al., Long-Lasting Immunity by Early Infection of 
Maternal-Antibody-Protected Infants, 40 EUR. J. IMMUNOLOGY 113 (2010)). 
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measles vaccines have decreased the expression of measles 
infections, it has not necessarily improved the bigger picture.136 
In sum, two doses of measles vaccine, even to one hundred percent 
of school populations, does not ensure societal protection from 
measles outbreaks. While there may be strong rationales for 
individuals to choose to vaccinate, there would appear to be a weak 
rationale to compel all children to take the vaccine if one hundred 
percent vaccination cannot reliably induce herd immunity. 
2. The Case of Varicella Vaccination and Immunity 
The U.S. varicella vaccination program provides perhaps an even 
more troubling example of imperfect vaccines and herd immunity. 
Drs. Goldman and King have surveyed this program since its 
inception in 1995.137 They concluded, based on extensive data and 
analysis, that “rather than eliminating varicella in children as 
promised, routine vaccination against varicella has proven extremely 
costly and has created continual cycles of treatment and disease.”138 
a. The Rollout of the U.S. Varicella Program 
The varicella-zoster virus (VZV) causes chickenpox or varicella as 
a primary infection.139 A latency period follows the initial infection, 
after which the lifelong VZV can subsequently reactivate as herpes 
zoster (HZ), commonly known as shingles, a secondary infection. 
After only short-term safety and efficacy clinical trials, 
pharmaceutical company Merck licensed its varicella vaccine for 
children one year of age and older.140 By 1996, the CDC’s Advisory 
Committee on Immunization Practices had recommended it for 
universal use in children twelve to eighteen months.141 As of 
 
136 Id. 
137 G.S. Goldman & P.G. King, Review of the United States Universal Varicella 
Vaccination Program: Herpes Zoster Incidence Rates, Cost-Effectiveness, and Vaccine 
Efficacy Based Primarily on the Antelope Valley Varicella Active Surveillance Project 
Data, 31 VACCINE 1680 (2013). 
138 Id. at 1691 (citations omitted). 
139 Id. at 1680. 
140 Id.  
141 Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Prevention of Varicella: Recommendations 
of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices (ACIP), 45 MORBIDITY & 
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1 (1996). 
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November 2012, all fifty states compelled varicella vaccination for 
preschool or schoolchildren.142 
In cost-benefit analyses done before the start of the program, public 
health officials focused on chickenpox, largely disregarding possible 
effects on HZ epidemiology.143 Lieu et al. modeled the cost-
effectiveness of a routine varicella vaccination program, finding that 
vaccination was not cost effective.144 Vaccine proponents could only 
justify the program by taking into account the cost of parents’ absence 
from work due to sick children.145 
Goldman worked as an analyst in one of the three CDC varicella 
surveillance sites from 1995 to 2005, so he closely observed the early 
rollout of the program.146 He argues that the cost-effectiveness 
analysis from the beginning was based on four key but incorrect 
assumptions: (1) the vaccine’s total cost of $40 per dose; (2) a single 
dose confers lifelong immunity; (3) vaccine effectiveness is between 
85%–95% with negligible adverse effects; and (4) a universal 
varicella program has no negative impact on the incidence of HZ.147 
There were many at the prelicensure phase who questioned these 
optimistic assumptions, but the licensure process moved forward 
nonetheless.148 After licensure, the cost of the vaccine doubled, and 
one dose failed to protect against disease breakthroughs.149 An 
accurate preliminary cost-benefit analysis would have scratched the 
program. 
In addition, though, the assumptions about adverse events and the 
influence on HZ were way off the mark. People have reported a wide 
range of adverse events from the varicella vaccine, which proponents 
had characterized as negligible. These have included problems with 
vision, the central nervous system, rashes, strokes, secondary 
transmission to others, pneumonia, breakthrough varicella, Stevens-
Johnson syndrome, autoimmune disorders, and death.150 A 2005 
 
142 Varicella Prevention Mandates, IMMUNIZATION ACTION COALITION, http://www 
.immunize.org/laws/varicel.asp (last updated Nov. 1, 2012). 
143 Goldman & King, supra note 137, at 1680. 
144 Id. at 1689. 
145 Id. 
146 Id. at 1681. 
147 Id. at 1685. 
148 Id. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 1690. 
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study found adverse events in one-sixth of the subjects within forty-
two days following vaccination.151 
b. Herpes Zoster and Varicella Zoster Virus 
Goldman observed herd effect when varicella case reports dropped 
precipitously after introduction of the vaccine, but saw that the 
surveillance sites were not capturing data on HZ prevalence. Starting 
in 2000, at Goldman’s recommendation, his surveillance site started 
to track HZ incidences. After two years, HZ reports remained the 
same or increased in every adult category except those for adults 
older than seventy.152 HZ had also increased among children who 
previously had chickenpox.153 When Goldman sought to publish data 
about trends in HZ, his supervisor arranged for the Los Angeles 
County Legal Department to send him a “cease and desist” letter154 to 
censor publication of the studies.155 With a response from Goldman’s 
lawyer, the Los Angeles Legal Department dropped its demand, and 
he published three articles on VZV and HZ.156 
After widespread introduction of the vaccine in 2002, its 
effectiveness rate declined significantly, in large part because the 
boosting effects of naturally circulating varicella virus were gone.157 
Vaccine effectiveness declined rapidly and steeply, such that in 
several disease outbreaks, the reported vaccine effectiveness rates 
were between 44% and 56%.158 
The costs and complications of varicella and HZ in adults are a 
different magnitude than those of chickenpox in children. Because the 
 
151 Gary S. Goldman, The Case Against Universal Varicella Vaccination, 25 INT’L J. 
TOXICOLOGY 313, 315–16 (2006). 
152 Goldman & King, supra note 137, at 1681. 
153 Id. at 1682. 
154 See Brief Summary of Chickenpox: A New Epidemic of Disease and Corruption, DR. 
GOLDMAN ONLINE, http://www.drgoldmanonline.com/SummaryofChickenpoxVaccine 
.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2014) (discussing the “cease and desist” letter). 
155 Goldman & King, supra note 137, at 1682. 
156 G.S. Goldman, Incidence of Herpes Zoster Among Children and Adolescents in a 
Community with Moderate Varicella Vaccination Coverage, 21 VACCINE 4243 (2003); 
G.S. Goldman, Using Capture-Recapture Methods to Assess Varicella Incidence in a 
Community Under Active Surveillance, 21 VACCINE 4250 (2003); Gary S. Goldman, 
Varicella Susceptibility and Incidence of Herpes Zoster Among Children and Adolescents 
in a Community Under Active Surveillance, 21 VACCINE 4238 (2003). 
157 Goldman, The Case Against Universal Varicella Vaccination, supra note 151, at 
314. 
158 Goldman & King, supra note 137, at 1689. 
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varicella vaccine’s protection is short-lived, it shifted chickenpox to a 
more vulnerable adult population. Chickenpox in adults carries 20 
times more risk of death and 10-15 times more risk of hospitalization 
compared to chickenpox in children.159 A 2005 article reported that 
the universal varicella vaccination program caused an additional 14.6 
million HZ cases, or a 42% increase among adults younger than fifty 
during a fifty-year period at a significant medical cost burden.160 
The rationales for the varicella vaccination program were weak 
from the outset and weakened further with time. Rather than 
acknowledge problems and debate solutions when its weaknesses 
became clear, public health officials apparently made serious attempts 
to censor problematic information. Neither medical rationales (such 
as herd immunity) nor cost rationales (based on true cost-benefit 
analysis) seem to justify the vaccination program. Here, pursuing the 
objective of herd immunity created a far more costly public health 
problem than an elective program pursuing herd effect would have 
created. The varicella vaccine’s apparent vaccine effectiveness rate 
was higher when the virus was in circulation. The marginal gains 
from the program have not outweighed their marginal costs. This 
recent example of a compulsory program to achieve herd immunity 
backfired; instead of herd immunity, the program created herd effect 
and a series of new, serious public health problems. 
To be clear, vaccines have an important role in modern public 
health policy. Herd immunity as a theory, however, provides an 
irrational basis for guiding policy, leading to inefficiencies in the 
marketplace. Furthermore, policies based on herd immunity constrain 
the significant positive role that individual choice can play in 
furthering the public health.161 Indeed, many of the failures noted 
above are a result of the modern insistence on compulsory vaccination 
as the only solution to the problem of infectious disease. Mandatory 
programs rely on unattainable herd immunity, which improperly 
balances the costs to individuals and the healthcare system with the 
marginal benefits from compulsory policies. 
 
159 Id. at 1691. 
160 Id. at 1689. 
161 In the language of administrative law, reliance on the herd immunity theory as the 
basis for vaccination policy must not be “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion.” 
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
HOLLAND (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2014  9:32 AM 
2014] Herd Immunity and Compulsory Childhood Vaccination: 29 
Does the Theory Justify the Law? 
F. Eradication Versus Elimination: What Can Vaccination Policy 
Achieve? 
Herd immunity theory rationalizes elimination of infection within a 
specific population, driving transmission of a disease to zero.162 
Eradication requires global coordination of disease-control programs 
to ensure that a pathogen is not able to reintroduce itself anywhere in 
the world.163 As a result, achieving disease eradication or extinction 
involves huge investments of healthcare resources toward the goals of 
developing safe and effective vaccines, ensuring sufficient 
vaccination coverage to ensure herd immunity in all geographic 
regions, and efficiently tracking and isolating infections as they 
arise.164 
Hinman and others have developed specific terminology to 
describe the possible objectives of vaccination policy, reproduced 
below165: 
1. Control: Reduction of disease incidence, prevalence, morbidity, 
or mortality to a locally acceptable level as a result of deliberate 
efforts; continued intervention measures are required to maintain 
the reduction; 
2. Elimination of disease: Reduction to zero of the incidence of a 
specified disease in a defined geographic area as a result of 
deliberate efforts; continued intervention measures are required; 
3. Elimination of infection: Reduction to zero of the incidence of 
infection caused by a specific agent in a defined geographic area as 
a result of deliberate efforts; continued measures to prevent 
reestablishment of transmission are required; 
4. Eradication: Permanent reduction to zero of the worldwide 
incidence of infection caused by a specific agent as a result of 
deliberate efforts; intervention measures are no longer needed; 
5. Extinction: The specific infectious agent no longer exists in 
nature or the laboratory. 
This hierarchy highlights the inherent geographic limitations of 
vaccination policy. Extinction and eradication involve global removal 
 
162 A. Hinman, Eradication of Vaccine-Preventable Diseases, 20 ANN. REV. PUB. 
HEALTH 211, 213 (1999). 
163 Id. 
164 See generally Fine, History, supra note 2 (detailing the efforts made throughout 
history toward global eradication of various diseases, including smallpox, influenza, polio, 
and pertussis). 
165 Hinman, supra note 162. 
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of a specific pathogen from nature, whereas control and elimination, 
both of disease and of infection, primarily concern local efforts to 
mitigate disease.166 Few diseases have ever been eradicated; 
extinction has never been achieved for any modern pathogen.167 
Hinman identified the following factors favoring eradicability168: 
1. A highly effective, safe, cheap, and stable vaccine; 
2. Lifelong immunity after natural infection or immunization; 
3. A short period of communicability; 
4. A highly characteristic clinical disease syndrome; 
5. An easy and reliable means of diagnosis; 
6. The absence of a nonhuman or environmental reservoir of 
disease; 
7. A genetically stable causative agent; and 
8. Seasonality of occurrence. 
These factors for effective disease eradication raise several issues 
for a “just” vaccination policy that we address in Part II below. 
1. Limitations on U.S. Vaccination Policy 
Can U.S. vaccination programs achieve control, elimination, or 
eradication of disease? Vaccine technology influences the theoretical 
capability to achieve any of these goals.169 If the rate of vaccine 
failure exceeds the herd immunity threshold, society can never 
achieve elimination or eradication.170 Therefore, disease control is 
likely the only feasible objective of vaccination programs when 
society possesses imperfect and potentially harmful vaccination tools. 
If the harms of vaccination are high, increasing vaccination 
coverage imposes higher costs on society through adverse health 
effects.171 When herd immunity is lacking, the marginal costs of 
mandates exceed their marginal benefits.172 In the “just” vaccination 
framework, the results misallocate healthcare resources and fail to 
properly account for the individual’s autonomy interest.173 
 
166 Id. at 213–14. 
167 David H. Molyneux et al., Disease Eradication, Elimination and Control: The Need 
for Accurate and Consistent Usage, 20 TRENDS PARASITOLOGY 347, 347 (2004). 
168 Hinman, supra note 162, at 214. 
169 See infra Part II.D.4. 
170 See id. 
171 Steve P. Calandrillo, Vanishing Vaccinations: Why Are So Many Americans Opting 
Out of Vaccinating Their Children?, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 353, 388–93 (2004). 
172 See infra Part II. 
173 See supra Part I. 
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2. Communicability, Diagnosis, and the Problems of Contact Tracing 
The capacity to control, eliminate, or eradicate a disease depends 
on the ability to identify cases of infection and proceed rapidly to 
isolate and treat them.174 For a population lacking herd immunity, 
disease transmission among susceptible people is inevitable.175 
Control of infectious outbreaks then involves the process of contact 
tracing.176 Contact tracing is the “backward” mapping of disease 
spread. Starting from any infected person or group of infected people, 
the problem is tracing the line of infectious contacts back to the first 
known “index” case, treating individuals along the chain to prevent 
further transmission.177 Contact tracing is an iterative process that 
attempts to identify all contacts for each infected index case.178 
If the rate of disease spread exceeds the rate at which scientists can 
trace cases, then the disease will spread faster than it is possible to 
control it, and contact tracing will fail.179 The resulting “race to trace” 
involves a competition between infectious dynamics and the ability to 
identify and trace infectious individuals.180 A short period of disease 
communicability facilitates elimination of a disease.181 Conversely, a 
long period of communicability makes eradication or elimination 
virtually impossible.182 
3. Disease Adaptability 
To successfully eradicate infectious disease, the pathogen must be 
stable, and there must be no animal or other reservoir for the 
disease.183 If a particular pathogen is not genetically stable, then 
 
174 See Ken T.D. Eames & Matt J. Keeling, Contact Tracing and Disease Control, 270 
PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON 2565, 2569 (2003) (describing contact tracing as efficient 
means of identifying cases of infection). 
175 See Fine, Rough Guide, supra note 2, at 913. 
176 See Ken T.D. Eames, Contact Tracing Strategies in Heterogeneous Populations, 
135 EPIDEMIOLOGY & INFECTION 443, 443 (2006) (discussing models of contact tracing); 
Eames & Keeling, supra note 174, at 2565 (discussing how contact tracing can efficiently 
be used to identify individuals with sexually transmitted diseases). 
177 See Eames, supra note 176, at 444. 
178 See id. at 446. 
179 See id. at 448. 
180 See id. at 450. 
181 See id. at 448. 
182 See id. 
183 See David M. Morens & Anthony S. Fauci, Emerging Infectious Diseases: Threats 
to Human Health and Global Stability, 9 PLOS PATHOGENS 1, 2–3 (2013) (discussing 
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vaccines may not afford any protection against related strains.184 A 
prime example is Bordetella parapertussis, which causes symptoms 
similar to Bordetella pertussis, the bacterium responsible for 
whooping cough.185 Immunity to B. pertussis does not confer 
immunity against B. parapertussis, suggesting that the current B. 
parapertussis virus may have evolved in response to vaccination 
against B. pertussis.186  
Diseases can also spread through animal and insect vectors.187 For 
example, malaria infects humans through mosquitoes, so efforts to 
control malaria require insect-control programs.188 More generally, 
when a pathogen can survive in nonhuman reservoirs, it can continue 
to infect the human population.189 In many cases it may be impossible 
to identify which nonhuman repositories exist, making eradication 
unachievable.190 
Disease eradication seems unattainable in the near future for all 
infectious childhood diseases, including measles and chickenpox.191 
Disease control seems to be the most viable goal. We consider next a 
framework within which to evaluate vaccination program objectives. 
II 
“JUST” VACCINATION POLICY AND PUBLIC HEALTH 
Because herd immunity is not an appropriate objective of 
contemporary vaccination policy, the normative question arises as to 
what should be the correct goal. To address this issue, we adopt the 
Feudtner-Marcuse model of “just” vaccination policy, which 
identifies seven factors that must be appropriately weighted and 
balanced in designing vaccination programs. 
 
common reemergence of diseases with nonhuman reservoirs and pathogens that undergo 
rapid changes). 
184 See Daniel N. Wolfe et al., The O Antigen Enables Bordetella Parapertussis to Avoid 
Bordetella Pertussis-Induced Immunity, 75 INFECTION & IMMUNITY 4972, 4978 (2007). 
185 See id. at 4972. 
186 See SUZANNE HUMPHRIES & ROMAN BYSTRIANYK, DISSOLVING ILLUSIONS: 
DISEASE, VACCINES, AND THE FORGOTTEN HISTORY 324–30 (2013) (discussing “original 
antigenic sin committed by vaccination”); see also id. 
187 See Molyneux et al., supra note 167, at 351 (contemplating that insect vectors, such 
as mosquitoes, can infect humans with diseases). 
188 See id. at 350 tbl.2. 
189 See id. at 349. 
190 See id. 
191 See infra Part III. 
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Drs. Feudtner and Marcuse, who have worked extensively on U.S. 
vaccination programs, introduced the “just” vaccination policy 
framework more than a decade ago.192 Overall, we agree with the 
elements of their framework; however, we draw substantially 
different conclusions concerning current U.S. vaccination policy. 
A. Framework for “Just” Vaccination Policy 
Feudtner and Marcuse’s framework provides seven objectives for 
modern vaccination policy193: 
1. Minimization of the deleterious effects of disease; 
2. Minimization of the deleterious effects of vaccination; 
3. Optimization of personal liberty to choose or to refuse 
vaccination;194 
4. Maximization of an equitable distribution of benefits and 
burdens across members of society; 
5. Promotion of the duty of families to protect children; 
6. Promotion of the duty of society to protect current and future 
children; and 
7. Prudent utilization of healthcare resources.195 
The framework provides a reasonably comprehensive approach, 
although the model entirely discounts the possible benefits of 
contracting and overcoming disease naturally, thereby achieving long-
lasting immunity. Below, we explore open questions about how to 
weigh the factors in “just” vaccination policy.196 
Feudtner and Marcuse propose three types of programs: elective, 
recommended, and mandatory. An elective program uses public 
education to inform individuals about the availability, benefits, and 
risks of vaccination, but leaves the choice to immunize at the sole 
 
192 See Chris Feudtner & Edgar K. Marcuse, Ethics and Immunization Policy: 
Promoting Dialogue to Sustain Consensus, 107 PEDIATRICS 1158 (2001). 
193 Id. at 1163 tbl.2. 
194 Although Feudtner and Marcuse refer to the personal liberty objective in terms of 
“optimization,” it is somewhat ambiguous whether this term is equivalent to maximization 
in the same sense as used in the other objectives or whether Feudtner and Marcuse intend 
this factor to carry less weight in the balancing analysis. This distinction in turn depends 
on the questions of how and whether to weigh these factors. 
195 Feudtner & Marcuse, supra note 192, at 1163 tbl.2. 
196 Indeed, Feudtner and Marcuse analyze their model with what amounts essentially to 
a tabulation of the various factors. Such an approach avoids the difficult question of 
weighing the policy considerations, but we also disagree with many of their conclusions 
concerning whether mandatory vaccination programs best achieve certain objectives. 
HOLLAND (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2014  9:32 AM 
34 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93, 1 
discretion of parents in the case of childhood vaccination.197 A 
recommended program, by contrast, uses public education and expert 
advice to induce uptake.198 Whereas the elective program provides 
information to the vaccine consumer but offers no opinion, 
recommended programs aim to raise immunization rates.199 Finally, 
mandatory programs leave almost no discretion to individuals on 
whether to vaccinate, with significant penalties for non-
compliance.200 
Feudtner and Marcuse argue that mandatory programs best 
minimize disease harms, maximize the equitable distribution of 
benefits and burdens within society, promote the societal duty to 
protect children, and use healthcare resources most prudently.201 
They acknowledge, though, that elective programs best minimize 
vaccine harms and optimize personal liberty.202 Furthermore, they 
assert that recommended programs best promote a familial duty to 
protect children.203 In the model, a simple tabulation of the seven 
factors suggests that mandatory programs are the most “just.”204 But 
to what extent does this conclusion follow? Agreeing with the 
model’s objectives in principle, we consider each of their factors in 
turn. 
1. Minimization of Disease Harm 
A vaccination program in theory can reduce the risk of harm from 
infectious disease to zero if it completely eliminates the disease from 
circulation. The conclusion that a mandatory program best achieves 
this objective assumes that mandates ensure the highest level of 
uptake, thus reducing the rate at which disease can spread. Based on 
this theory, policymakers believe that minimizing individual choice 
necessarily reduces disease harms.205 Imposing penalties for failure to 
vaccinate requires each individual to take on the burden of the 
collective, conceivably increasing the number of individuals willing 
to vaccinate. 
 




201 Id. at 1163 tbl.2. 
202 Id. at 1163. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. 
205 Id. at 1161. 
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This analysis fails, however, when it is possible to eliminate or 
sufficiently mitigate the spread of infection without requiring all 
individuals to vaccinate. If herd immunity is possible, then society 
can obtain the same benefits without imposing unnecessary 
vaccination costs. The herd immunity theory applies precisely to this 
situation because it predicts a unique threshold beyond which a 
disease can no longer sustain infection throughout the population. If 
enough people in society have immunity, and if either a 
recommended or an elective program is sufficient to achieve the herd 
immunity threshold, then mandatory programs impose excessive costs 
with no marginal gains. These costs include manufacturing, 
healthcare providers, administration, and the costs of potential injury 
and treatment. 
2. Minimization of Vaccine Harm 
Vaccine harm is zero when people do not vaccinate, making this 
objective the opposite of factor one’s minimization of disease harms. 
Some balance between disease prevention and protection against 
vaccine harms is necessary. Mandatory programs do not necessarily 
reconcile these competing objectives, given the temporary protection 
of vaccine-induced immunity and the uncertainty about potential 
vaccine harms. Conversely, choosing a purely elective program may 
or may not reach the herd immunity threshold and sufficiently prevent 
disease in the broader society. Nevertheless, as Feudtner and Marcuse 
acknowledge, an elective program best minimizes vaccine-related 
harms.206 
3. Maximization of an Equitable Distribution of Benefits and Harms 
In the absence of vaccines, all people share the expected risks of 
disease, but they do not share them equally.207 People of different 
ages and health statuses have differing levels of natural immunity.208 
Natural immunity implies that, with age, more and more people have 
acquired the disease, recovered from it, and subsequently become 
immune.209 This is because: (1) a longer lifetime implies a greater 
chance of having already encountered the disease, and (2) naturally-
 
206 Id. at 1163 tbl.2. 
207 See, e.g., Reluga et al., supra note 98, at 2711–19. 
208 Id. at 2718. 
209 See id. at 2718–19. 
HOLLAND (DO NOT DELETE) 10/23/2014  9:32 AM 
36 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93, 1 
acquired immunity among older individuals makes it more difficult 
for the disease to sustain itself among that group.210 Thus, the result is 
that children are ordinarily at greater risk of infection than healthy 
adults.211 
Vaccines create competing risks between infection and injury. On 
the one hand, requiring all children to vaccinate ensures that all 
children face the risks of both vaccination and disease. But such a 
program may not be preferable, however, if only a small portion of 
the population is particularly susceptible. Requiring vaccination of 
non-susceptible individuals forces them to accept risks without 
benefits, a scenario that raises the specter of constitutional equal 
protection violations under the Fourteenth Amendment.212 
4. Optimization of Personal Liberty 
Elective vaccination programs maximize individual choice, 
protecting the autonomy interest in bodily integrity.213 How much 
weight should we give to this? Feudtner and Marcuse give individual 
liberty little or no deference, nor do other proponents of mandatory 
vaccination.214 
Several commentators have recently proposed tort-based 
negligence liability for individuals who choose not to vaccinate and 
transmit disease.215 They argue that the tort system would then force 
unvaccinated individuals to accept responsibility for their choice.216 
Such a proposal is another form of a mandatory program with 
enforcement through civil liability. Individuals then would discount 
the possible risks of their actions by the “detection” probability of 
 
210 See id. at 2712. 
211 However, this observation is not universally true. One prominent example is rubella, 
which can have severe health complications on unborn children when acquired by a 
pregnant mother. In this case, the most severe health costs may be associated with the 
older subpopulation of pregnant women, which may alter the choice of a vaccination 
program. See generally id. at 2711–21. 
212 See Holland, supra note 63, at 42–59, 85. 
213 Feudtner & Marcuse, supra note 192, at 1163 tbl.2. 
214 See generally Gregory A. Poland & Robert M. Jacobson, The Clinician’s Guide to 
the Anti-Vaccinationists’ Galaxy, 73 HUMAN IMMUNOLOGY 859 (2012); Susanne Sheehy 
& Joel Meyer, Should Participation in Vaccine Clinical Trials be Mandated?, 14 VIRTUAL 
MENTOR 35 (2012) (suggesting that the government should enforce a duty for all citizens 
to participate in clinical trials). 
215 See generally Rebecca Rodal & Kumanan Wilson, Could Parents Be Held Liable 
for Not Immunizing Their Children?, 4 MCGILL J.L. & HEALTH 39 (2010); Diekema, 
supra note 7. 
216 See Diekema, supra note 7, at 94. 
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facing a lawsuit.217 Despite valuation problems, Feudtner and 
Marcuse acknowledge that elective vaccination programs best 
maximize liberty for parents to choose on their children’s behalf.218 
5. Promotion of a Familial Duty to Protect Children 
Feudtner and Marcuse identify the familial duty to protect children 
as the sole objective that a recommended program best fulfills, 
arguing that medical professionals can best help families protect 
children.219 Parents concerned about the potential harms of vaccines 
are often in direct conflict with their physicians, some of whom refuse 
to accept and retain children in their practices who fail to comply with 
vaccination recommendations.220 Unfortunately, physicians who 
refuse to see noncompliant families may leave them without 
healthcare.221 A recommended program may serve the interests of 
protecting children while preserving the right to informed consent for 
the parent, but both physician and patient are on uncertain ground.222 
By contrast, a mandatory program gives parents no discretion to act 
in their own children’s best interests, a situation that drives a wedge 
between parents and physicians.223 This could result in a “black 
market” of vaccination records, providing false information, and 
inhibiting the capacity of state, local, and federal agencies to track 
and contain the spread of disease in the event of an epidemic. Just as 
in the cases of abortion, medical use of marijuana, and other medical 
prohibitions, some families simply will not comply with state public 
health laws as a matter of conscience. 
6. Promotion of a Societal Duty to Protect Children 
Feudtner and Marcuse conclude that mandatory vaccination 
programs, rather than recommended ones, best promote society’s duty 
to protect children.224 Some view mandatory programs as the best 
 
217 See Rodal & Wilson, supra note 215, at 63. 
218 Feudtner & Marcuse, supra note 192, at 1162. 
219 Id. at 1163. 
220 See Douglas S. Diekema, Improving Childhood Vaccination Rates, 366 NEW ENG. 
J. MED. 391, 393 (2012) (noting that asking patients to seek other healthcare options is 
counterproductive). 
221 See id. 
222 Feudtner & Marcuse, supra note 192, at 1163. 
223 Id. at 1161. 
224 Feudtner & Marcuse, supra note 192, at 1163. 
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way for the state to exercise appropriate paternalism and prevent 
children from contracting disease. The reason for the discrepancy 
between society’s duty and the familial one is the recognition of an 
implied duty of care between all members of society and children, not 
just a recognition of the state’s duty to the child.225 The legal 
foundation for this implied duty is suspect, because there is no clear 
analog in common law criminal or tort systems for a duty to rescue, 
even when a person can do so at small or no cost to herself.226 If the 
common law is unwilling to impose liability on individuals toward 
strangers, Feudtner and Marcuse may be wrong as a matter of law to 
suggest that a mandatory program may impose a duty on all members 
of society to protect children. 
There is a distinction between a duty to rescue and an implied duty 
to vaccinate. Children have a higher risk of infection than healthy 
adults because of their age. If vaccine-induced harm carries a 
relatively small risk, then there may be a basis to impose such a duty 
on society as a whole. However, it still does not follow that 
mandatory vaccination is the optimal mechanism. Under the theory of 
herd immunity, society need not achieve complete vaccination 
coverage to mitigate the spread of infection.227 If a recommended or 
elective program can contain disease, then it is likely superior to a 
mandatory one. 
7. Prudent Utilization of Healthcare Resources 
Thoughtful use of resources, unlike the six factors above, refers to 
implementing a particular program rather than to theoretical tensions 
between liberty and collective security.228 At first, resource allocation 
may appear only incidental to a “just” vaccination program; on further 
examination, however, it is of primary importance in balancing 
society’s healthcare interests.229 This factor is foremost in the 
discussion of vaccination choice in Part III. Society should be willing 
to invest healthcare resources, including funding, infrastructure, and 
research, in those endeavors that are likely to achieve the greatest 
aggregate benefit at the lowest aggregate cost.230 Although Feudtner 
 
225 See id. at 1160. 
226 See generally Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L.J. 247 
(1980) (evaluating the case for imposing a duty to rescue). 
227 See Poland & Jacobson, supra note 214, at 862. 
228 See Feudtner & Marcuse, supra note 192, at 1163. 
229 See id. at 1160–61. 
230 See id. at 1161. 
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and Marcuse suggest that a mandatory program best achieves the 
prudent use of resources,231 this conclusion is doubtful. If the 
marginal benefit of a mandatory program does not exceed the 
marginal cost of implementation, then society can better invest its 
healthcare resources elsewhere.232 This observation is particularly 
true for most childhood infectious diseases where herd immunity is 
per se unachievable because the vaccine failure rate exceeds the herd 
immunity threshold.233 Undervaluing pragmatism risks exposing 
individuals to unnecessary harms for which there are no 
commensurate gains.234 This factor is absolutely critical to ensuring 
efficiency in the vaccination market and therefore must play a central 
role in designing vaccination programs. 
B. Weighing the Feudtner-Marcuse Factors 
Feudtner and Marcuse’s attempt to analyze the justice of 
vaccination policies is insightful.235 While we do not reach the same 
conclusions they do, we find their measurements relevant and worthy 
of further examination. We may agree that a uniform “just” 
vaccination policy is impossible.236 “Just” policies depend upon the 
specifics of the individual, the population, the disease, and the 
potential vaccine efficacy, injuries, and costs. There is no “one-size-
fits-all” solution, although that seems to be the goal of most 
mandatory programs. 
We argue that the original model undervalues considerations of 
individual autonomy, misapplies the notion of a social duty to 
vaccinate, and critically fails to provide a pragmatic use of healthcare 
resources for infectious disease. We claim that the proper focus of 
programs cannot be eradication of disease “at all costs”; indeed, 
Feudtner and Marcuse acknowledge this limitation by advocating 
prudent allocation of healthcare resources.237 Efficiency requires 
taking account not only of the costs of infection, but also of the costs 
 
231 Id. at 1163. 
232 See id. at 1161. 
233 See supra Part I.E.1.i. (discussing measles as an example for which herd immunity 
is likely unattainable given the rapid rate at which the disease spreads through a population 
and the relatively low vaccine efficacy). 
234 See Feudtner & Marcuse, supra note 192, at 1161. 
235 See id. at 1160. 
236 See id. at 1162. 
237 Id. at 1160. 
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of the “cure.”238 In striving for unattainable herd immunity, society 
pays a heavy price.239 
We conclude that the appropriate and rational objective of modern 
vaccination programs should be to maximize herd effect to the extent 
that marginal gains in vaccination coverage are not outweighed by the 
marginal costs to the individual, the healthcare system, and society. 
This objective is fully consistent with contemporary regulatory 
policy240 and properly balances individual choice, direct and indirect 
costs to healthcare, and the real benefit that vaccines provide in 
protecting individuals from infectious diseases. 
III 
A GAME THEORY ANALYSIS OF VACCINATION DECISIONS 
Proponents of mandatory policies argue that failure to vaccinate 
breaches an implied duty to other members of society to protect the 
herd.241 Under free rider assumptions, herd immunity cannot exist 
without government compulsion.242 Game theory, however, provides 
a useful alternative framework for examining the severity of the free 
rider problem. The aim of game theory is to identify optimal 
strategies for people in which their gains depend on others’ 
choices.243 Using game theory, Chris Bauch and David Earn have 
attempted to quantify the effect of risk perception on a person’s 
willingness to vaccinate with perfectly efficacious vaccines.244 Their 
analysis lays the foundation for market-based solutions to vaccination 
policy. In order to facilitate discussion, however, we will only 
generally review game theory and readers should refer to the original 
Bauch-Earn analysis for technical details.245 
 
238 See id. at 1163. 
239 See id. at 1161. 
240 See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 1(b)(6) (“Each agency shall . . . adopt a regulation 
only upon a reasoned determination that the benefits of the intended regulation justify its 
costs.”); id. at § 1(b)(11) (“Each agency shall tailor its regulations to impose the least 
burden on society, including individuals, businesses of differing sizes, and other entities     
. . . consistent with obtaining the regulatory objectives . . . .”). 
241 See Diekema, supra note 7, at 93 (suggesting that parents who do not vaccinate their 
children should be subject to civil negligence liability). 
242 See id. at 91. 
243 See generally KEN BINMORE, GAME THEORY: A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 
(2007) (discussing game theory and the way humans interact in certain cooperative 
scenarios). 
244 See generally Chris T. Bauch & David J.D. Earn, Vaccination and the Theory of 
Games, 101 PROCS. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 13391 (2004). 
245 See id. 
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A. Game Theory of Vaccination Choice 
The following scenario provides the framework for the Bauch-Earn 
“vaccination game.”246 Alice is a rational “player” in a large, 
homogeneous population trying to decide whether to vaccinate or to 
take her chances and get sick. To help her with the decision, she has 
in front of her a box of coins. Each coin is labeled according to the 
probability P that on any given toss it will come up heads; the coins 
are therefore biased, or rigged, to come up heads a specific fraction of 
the time. Alice can choose any coin in the box, and she will choose to 
vaccinate if, upon tossing the coin, it comes up heads; otherwise, she 
will not vaccinate. The “vaccination game” is therefore as follows: 
which coin should Alice choose in order to maximize her expected 
net health benefits, given that everyone else in the population is also 
playing this same game? In other words, how does Alice maximize 
her individual health benefits given the collective choices of others? 
The “vaccination game” is a form of cost-benefit analysis, based on 
the information she gathers from others’ “successes” in the game. 
Furthermore, Alice is not an automaton; her goal is not merely to 
decide whether to vaccinate but, more importantly, to pick the best 
coin, that is, the coin that will minimize her risks of both vaccination 
and infection. Specifically, if her coin comes up heads, then Alice will 
face the risks of potential vaccine injury and future booster shots to 
preserve immunity.247 Conversely, if the coin lands tails, then she 
faces the potential but uncertain risk of infection. Alice will discount 
the risks of infection by the probability that she may get sick, which 
decreases as a function of increasing vaccination coverage.248 At the 
herd immunity threshold, Alice’s risks of not vaccinating are zero 
because she can “free ride” on herd immunity. With her biased coin 
 
246 Id. at 13394 (describing how game theory can be used to develop schemes regarding 
disease eradication; the coin toss game set forth here serves as an illustration of the 
vaccination game described by Bauch and Earn). 
247 Note that this cost is an average cost over all possible “adverse” events of the 
vaccine, including the chance that nothing will happen. This average cost is always 
negative because the net benefit of the vaccine is prevention of the disease, which is not a 
net gain to the player if she does not have the disease when she starts the game. 
248 Beyond the herd immunity threshold, by definition the disease cannot support itself 
in the population, and no individual will attain the disease regardless of vaccination status. 
However, the rate at which a disease is transmitted through a population will increase as 
the fraction of people choosing to vaccinate falls below the herd immunity threshold, 
meaning that the probability of any individual acquiring the disease must also increase as 
the vaccine coverage level decreases. 
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and a perceived estimate of these risks, Alice can then figure out her 
best strategy. 
To understand how other players will affect Alice’s strategy in the 
“vaccination game,” assume that Bob is also playing the game with a 
biased coin that comes up heads with probability Q. If Alice and Bob 
have equal information about the risks of vaccination and 
infection,249 then they will both obtain gains. However, they will 
discount the risks differently because they are playing with different 
coins.250 Who then is doing better in the game by drawing a greater 
payoff, where the payoff is maximization of all benefits and 
minimization of all harms? If Bob is obtaining a greater payoff with 
coin Q, then there is no reason for Alice to play with coin P; the 
converse will be true if Alice obtains a better payoff. Furthermore, if 
Cindy can beat both Alice and Bob by using coin O, then both Alice 
and Bob will switch to Cindy’s coin. It is through this type of 
information exchange based on the performance of other players that 
we can identify the optimal strategy for the vaccination game, a coin 
P* with an expected payoff greater than with any other coin.251 
B. Theoretical Optimum Vaccination Choice Strategy 
There are two possible variants to the “vaccination game”: (1) the 
vaccine is perfectly efficacious, as in the scenario considered by 
Bauch and Earn,252 and (2) the vaccine is imperfect, as in the “real-
world” case. The analysis of this latter scenario is original to this 
Article. 
1. Using a Perfect Vaccine 
Bauch and Earn prove that there are two possible optimal strategies 
for the vaccination game with the perfectly efficacious vaccine.253 If 
 
249 Alice and Bob represent “average” members of the population in the sense that their 
estimates rely on the same information available to the public. The Bauch-Earn framework 
therefore faces several of the same limitations of the herd immunity theory discussed in 
Part II, but the results provide a useful systematic framework for evaluating the scope and 
direction of U.S. vaccination policy. 
250 Note that all players in the vaccination game will discount the costs of vaccination 
by the probability that the coin comes up heads and will similarly discount the costs of 
infection by the probability that the coin lands tails. 
251 See Bauch & Earn, supra note 244, at 13394 (Bauch and Earn prove that P* is a 
stable Nash equilibrium for the vaccination game, meaning roughly that it is indeed better 
than any other coin that Alice could choose from her box.). 
252 Id. 
253 Id. 
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the perceived risks of vaccination are greater than the perceived risks 
of infection when no one is vaccinating,254 then the optimal strategy 
is in fact never to vaccinate.255 Indeed, this “tragedy of the commons” 
occurs only when the costs to the individual from vaccine uptake are 
extraordinarily high. 
In the alternative case where the perceived vaccination risks are 
less than the worst-case infectious disease scenario, there is a stable 
equilibrium point P* between zero and one that Bauch and Earn show 
is equal to the vaccination coverage * necessary to exactly balance 
the risks of vaccination and infection.256 To understand why this 
result is true, note that when the perceived vaccination risks are less 
than the worst-case infectious disease scenario, then there must exist a 
vaccination coverage level * at which the expected risks of 
vaccination balance the risks of infection.257 If society vaccinates 
below this level, then risks of infection will be greater than the risks 
of vaccination, and unvaccinated individuals will have an incentive to 
vaccinate.258 Conversely, when society vaccinates above this level, 
the aggregate risks of vaccination exceed the aggregate harms of 
infection, and the incentive is to forego vaccination.259 Therefore, 
deviations in either direction from the equilibrium coverage * should 
return over time to this equilibrium point.260 The question is then 
whether * is at least equal to the herd immunity threshold H, the 
answer to which is no in practically all cases. Indeed, herd immunity 
is only obtainable as an equilibrium point when there are no further 
risks of vaccination or infection.261 Bauch and Earn verify this 
 
254 If no one in the population is vaccinating, then the vaccine coverage is zero, and the 
expected costs of infection are maximal for the individual. 
255 Bauch & Earn, supra note 244, at 13393. 
256 Id. at 13394. 
257 Recall that the probability of acquiring an infection decreases with increasing 
vaccine coverage from the “worst-case scenario” at zero coverage until it vanishes at the 
herd immunity threshold. Therefore, if the costs of vaccinating are below the “worst-case” 
level, these vaccination costs must meet with the expected infection costs at some 
vaccination level between zero and one.  
258 Bauch & Earn, supra note 244, at 13393–94. 
259 Id. 
260 Id. at 13394. 
261 The only point where the costs of infection are zero is at the herd immunity 
threshold, meaning that if the herd immunity threshold is an equilibrium point, the costs of 
vaccination must also vanish. 
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conclusion through simulations on model populations of susceptible, 
infectious, and recovered individuals.262 
2. Using an Imperfect Vaccine 
As in the real world, what if a vaccine provides imperfect 
immunity with an efficacy of probability ? The new setup for the 
vaccination game then has several important changes: 
 If Alice’s biased coin comes up heads, she faces the expected 
risks of the vaccine itself and also the expected risks of 
infection if the vaccine fails. 
 The expected risks of infection exist even at the herd immunity 
threshold because the vaccine is imperfect, meaning that society 
must invest additional resources to eliminate the disease. If the 
vaccine efficacy  is less than the herd immunity threshold, 
then herd immunity is impossible to achieve. 
If the perceived risks of vaccination are greater than the “worst-
case scenario” when no one vaccinates, then the optimal strategy is 
not to vaccinate.263 However, the vaccination risks need not be this 
high. Alice would still choose not to vaccinate even if the expected 
vaccination risks are below the “worst-case” infection risks, because 
she also expects to face some infection risks when she vaccinates with 
an imperfect vaccine. In fact, this analysis predicts this “do not 
vaccinate” result in all cases where the expected vaccination risks 
exceed the “worst-case” infection risks discounted by the probability 
of vaccine efficacy . 
C. Vaccination Choice Strategy in the “Real World” 
How does the equilibrium vaccination coverage with the imperfect 
vaccine compare to the result for the game with the perfect vaccine? 
Intuitively, one might think that the equilibrium vaccination coverage 
with the imperfect vaccine should be less than the corresponding 
equilibrium coverage for the perfect vaccine. However, it turns out 
that this result is only true when the expected vaccination risks are 
high. When the expected vaccination risks are relatively low,264 there 
 
262 Bauch & Earn, supra note 244, at 13392. 
263 Id. at 13393. 
264 The notion of “relatively low” can be made quantitative by comparing the infectious 
cost curves for the perfect and imperfect vaccines and by noting that there exists a “cross-
over” point at a certain level of vaccine coverage due to the longer tail on the cost 
distribution for the imperfect vaccine. 
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is a greater risk of infection than risk of vaccine harm.265 When a 
vaccine provides even incomplete protection to infection, the 
marginal benefit of using it may be perceived to be relatively large.266 
So what are the results of elective vaccination programs? A follow-
up article by Perisic and Bauch in 2009 suggests that they work.267 As 
with the herd immunity analysis in Part I, the game theory model 
assumes population homogeneity.268 Utilizing a network population 
model, in which individuals in the population only interact with 
neighbors with whom they share a connection, Perisic and Bauch 
show that altruism develops within tightly connected 
“neighborhoods” of individuals, decreasing the total spread of 
disease.269 Within small neighborhoods, people will voluntarily 
vaccinate with a relatively safe vaccine.270 As the neighborhood size 
increases, however, the infection is more likely to escape to infect the 
larger population, thereby approaching the disease dynamics in a 
homogeneous population.271 
Reluga, Medlock, Poolman, and Galvani have also shown that age 
stratification can affect optimal strategy.272 They show that because 
vaccination at a young age increases the average age of initial 
infection, it may be better for people to acquire natural immunity 
through infection at a young age rather than to risk greater harm from 
waning vaccine-induced immunity at a later age.273 Game theory 
suggests that a market will best balance vaccine and infection risks 
and benefits. 
Although not the conventional wisdom, evidence suggests that 
individual choice is not at odds with public health benefits from 
vaccines. To the extent that individuals contribute to herd effect both 
through vaccine-induced and natural immunity, “soft” regulation of 
the market can create the same or higher levels of public health more 
efficiently than compulsion. Indeed, Drs. Yang and Debold have 
recently demonstrated that for several diseases, there is no statistically 
 
265 Bauch & Earn, supra note 244, at 13393–94. 
266 Id. 
267 Ana Perisic & Chris T. Bauch, Social Contact Networks and Disease Eradicability 





272 Reluga et al., supra note 98. 
273 Id. at 2718–19. 
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significant relationship, at the ninety-five percent confidence level, 
between measures of non-medical childhood disease exemptions and 
disease incidence rates in the fifty states.274 Although several open 
issues of their study remain for the scientific literature to consider,275 
their empirically-based study results strongly reinforce the view that 
herd immunity should not be the de facto objective of vaccination 
policy. 
A voluntary approach to maximizing herd effect ensures efficiency 
of the vaccination marketplace and preserves individual choice. 
Policymakers should reconsider the appropriate level of regulation of 
the vaccination market, explicitly balancing the costs of vaccination 
coverage with the expected benefits from a particular vaccination 
program.276 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Herd immunity is generally unattainable in the real world because 
key assumptions, like population homogeneity, do not exist and 
because current vaccine technology is imperfect. Vaccination 
programs should therefore aim to achieve herd effect, not herd 
immunity and concomitantly, disease control rather than eradication. 
The free rider problem is a red herring. The Bauch-Earn game 
theory analysis and experience suggest that it does not drive 
individual decision making in the real world.277 If safe and effective 
vaccines are available, most people will voluntarily accept the risks of 
vaccination rather than the potential risks of serious infectious 
disease. 
Market forces will naturally lead to an equilibrium point for 
vaccination; mandates to increase coverage above the equilibrium 
point yield little or no marginal gains in the absence of obtainable 
herd immunity. Vaccination programs should therefore focus on 
“soft” regulation by investing in safer and more efficacious vaccine 
 
274 Yang & Debold, supra note 14, at 374–76. 
275 Id. at 375. 
276 See OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 8, at 9–10 (noting that an agency 
“should also perform a [benefit-cost analysis] for major health and safety rulemakings to 
the extent that valid monetary values can be assigned to the primary expected health and 
safety outcomes[,]” and that even “[i]f the non-quantified benefits and costs are likely to 
be important, [the agency] should recommend which of the non-quantified factors are of 
sufficient importance to justify consideration in the regulatory decision”). 
277 Bauch & Earn, supra note 244, at 13393–94. 
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technology, ensuring informed consent and opening lines of 
communication between parents, physicians, and policymakers. 
These conclusions lead to the following specific recommendations 
for U.S. federal and state vaccine policy makers. First, federal and 
state vaccination programs should acknowledge that the goal of 
vaccine policy is to control disease, not eradicate it. Effective 
programs should focus on creating herd effect, not herd immunity, 
and take into account all the economic costs and health risks of 
vaccination. 
Second, states should experiment with market-based approaches to 
vaccination, freeing resources otherwise devoted to compliance to 
other healthcare needs. States can change mandates to recommended 
or elective programs with relative ease and observe what 
consequences follow. States can start by removing those vaccination 
mandates that have inadequate public health rationales, such as the 
mandate for tetanus, which is non-contagious, and for hepatitis B, 
which is primarily sexually transmitted and a disease for which 
children are at low risk. 
Third, states should ensure that vaccine consumers receive 
complete information to make rational choices. States can impose 
higher informational requirements than current federal law. Under 
federal law, parents are required to receive only minimal information 
on vaccination benefits and risks.278 States should require that parents 
or guardians receive all the information they would otherwise obtain 
with any prescription drug. 
*** 
Parents can and should be able to determine their own children’s 
best interests and voluntarily choose vaccines based on complete and 
accurate information. Prior, free, and informed consent is the 
hallmark of modern ethical medicine.279 The “choice” between 
fulfilling a child’s vaccination mandates or foregoing her education is 
 
278 42 U.S.C. § 300aa—26 (2012) (describing the Vaccine Information Statements that 
the CDC now produces); see Vaccine Information Statements, CTRS. FOR DISEASE 
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vaccines/hcp/vis/index.html?s_cid=cs_000 
(last updated June 11, 2014). 
279 Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, UNITED NATIONS EDUC., 
SCIENTIFIC, AND CULTURAL ORG. (UNESCO), at art. 6 (2005), unesdoc.unesco.org 
/images/0014/001461/146180e.pdf (“Any preventive, diagnostic and therapeutic medical 
intervention is only to be carried out with the prior, free and informed consent of the 
person concerned, based on adequate information.”). 
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scarcely a voluntary choice; it is a coerced choice at best. Because 
public health policies have not attained herd immunity for any 
childhood disease despite sixty years of compulsory policies and 
intensive effort, it seems both logical and wise to recalculate our 
policies. It is time to abandon the illusion of herd immunity through 
compulsion and to adopt realistic and respectful policies to achieve 
herd effect based on parents’ informed choices. 
 
 
